

GALVANISING TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE TO SUPPORT ALLIED PROSPERITY AND SECURITY

RESOLUTION 493^{*}

The Assembly,

1. **Stressing** that maintaining NATO and Allied technological superiority is paramount in a security environment characterised by renewed strategic competition between democratic Allies and autocratic powers;

2. *Recognising* that both Allied and competitor country military systems increasingly rely on commercially developed technologies;

3. **Determined** to step up support for technological innovation and adoption across the Alliance, while redoubling efforts to secure supply chains and limit competitor countries' access to the most militarily sensitive technologies without resorting to blanket protectionism;

4. **Concerned** that China's growing economic and technological capabilities coupled with its capacity to acquire sensitive Western technologies with military applications through legal and illegal means pose a serious strategic challenge to Allies and partners;

5. **Noting** China's stated ambition to achieve a dominant position in key technology markets, many of which have military applications, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), aerospace, biotech, information technology, smart manufacturing, maritime engineering, advanced rail, electric vehicles, and other electrical equipment;

6. **Understanding** that AI is a force multiplier that will strongly condition future markets and battlefields, and that it too has become a source of mounting trade and geostrategic tension;

7. **Welcoming** the determination of Allied countries and partners to fully leverage the positive potential of AI while developing regulations and standards to address the potential dangers posed by AI and to thwart those intent on deploying AI as a weapon against the democratic world;

8. **Supporting** the establishment of tough and comprehensive sanctions regimes, including technology access restrictions, aiming to undermine Russia's capacity to sustain its war of aggression against Ukraine;

9. **Applauding** the significant investments that North America, Europe, and partner countries like Japan and the Republic of Korea have made in semiconductor manufacturing to ensure that critical commercial and defence industries will have assured access to these essential industrial components into the future;

10. *Recognising* that at least 92% of the world's most advanced (below ten nanometers) semiconductor manufacturing capacity is currently located in Taiwan;

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11. *Endorsing* western commercial and government efforts to strengthen defences against intellectual property theft;

12. *Recognising* that the evolving nature of military equipment development demands new, technically and politically challenging export control strategies;

13. **Condemning** Russia's evasion of export controls and sanctions to acquire restricted western technologies that it incorporates into weapons systems used in its illegal and unjustified war in Ukraine and similar efforts carried out by Iran and North Korea;

14. **Acknowledging** that the resale of restricted technologies to countries where technology restrictions do not apply or are not rigorously enforced facilitates the diversion of these technologies to strategic competitors;

15. **Concerned**, moreover, that western governments have under-resourced export controls and sanction enforcement efforts, which effectively lowers the risks and costs to those engaged in circumventing those restrictions;

16. **Cognisant** that effective technology export control regimes require coalitions among Allies and partners collectively working to ensure comprehensive restrictions that restrict rivals' access to militarily sensitive technologies;

17. **Welcoming** the AUKUS partnership engaging Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which represents an important advance in technology sharing and defence industrial cooperation among two key NATO Allies and an Indo-Pacific partner, and which could become a model for expanded technological collaboration among democracies in the future, as well as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) between Japan, Italy and the United Kingdom, which similarly engages two NATO members and an Indo-Pacific partner and is open for other countries to join;

18. **Observing** that NATO Allies must maintain well-funded innovation programmes in partnership with the private sector and universities to better exploit the commercial and strategic advantages of technology;

19. *Encouraged* that NATO recognises shared technology development as a critical force multiplier which enhances interoperability and efficiency while fostering critical defence industrial links among Allies;

20. *Endorsing* NATO's recognition of the challenge that strategic competitors pose in this domain and particularly their shared efforts to thwart Allied technology export restrictions;

21. **Supporting** efforts like the NATO-Ukraine Innovation Cooperation Roadmap, which defines shared objectives to guide NATO's technology cooperation with that important partner and outlines key workstreams under four delivery areas: innovation policy enablers, innovation ecosystem engagement, pilot activities and lessons learned;

22. **Recognising** that a continuous dialogue between national defence ministries, agencies and scientific and defence industrial communities can facilitate efforts to integrate emerging technologies into national force structures;

23. *Applauding* the launch and ongoing build-up of NATO's DIANA programme which underscores the Alliance's commitment to technology innovation;

24. **Convinced** that NATO Allies require a comprehensive framework for securing supply chains and regulating trade in sensitive technologies with competitor nations and should coordinate their approaches in this domain;

- 25. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - to dedicate more political attention and resources to counter the risks of technology leakages through trade, targeted investments in western firms undertaken by strategic competitors, smuggling, and espionage;
 - b. to recognise the full scope of China's technological and strategic ambitions and its tendency to engage in technology theft to achieve these and to invest substantial resources towards these ends in collaborating with other strategic competitors;
 - to collaborate more closely with partners in the Indo-Pacific in research and development, academic exchanges, and efforts to secure supply chains for the critical inputs needed to expand production of key technologies;
 - d. to enforce existing and secondary sanctions and export restrictions relating to military technology and increase cooperation relating to the development of appropriate measures to increase the economic resiliency of the Alliance in the face of strategic competition from such countries as Russia and China;
 - e. to coordinate export controls on emerging dual-use technologies and strategic intellectual property, including through relevant international forums, so that strategic competitors are prevented from accessing critical technology that could be used to threaten the security of Allies and partners;
 - f. to strike workable balances between security considerations and open trading principles, particularly among like-minded states, that avoid overly stringent controls and outright protectionism that would hinder innovation, undermine competitiveness, and unduly raise prices;
 - g. to bolster transparency about the nature of technology-driven security threats so that companies are better placed to factor in national security considerations when making trade and investment decisions;
 - h. to ensure that proper rules and enforcement measures are in place so that inward and outward investments are not leading to the proliferation of sensitive technologies;
 - i. to strengthen public-private-university partnerships to drive technology development;
 - j. to support Ukrainian efforts to develop and access key technologies it can use to defend its sovereignty and protect its people;
 - k. to support NATO efforts to work with public and private sector partners, academic and civil society, in accordance with relevant NATO policies and procedures, to develop and adopt new technologies, establish international principles of responsible use, and maintain NATO's technological edge through innovation;
 - I. to allocate public funding needed to underwrite technological advances with military applications, in line with the renewed commitment to defence and investment spending adopted at the 2023 Vilnius Summit and reiterated at the 2024 Washington Summit.